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Abstract-We study multi path routing with traffic assignment 
in selfish networks. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 
auction, an optimal and strategy-proof scheme, known as optimal 
auction-based multipath routing (OAMR), is developed. However, 
OAMR is computationally expensive and cannot run in real time 
when the network size is large. Therefore, we propose sequential 
auction-based multi path routing (SAMR). SAMR handles routing 
requests sequentially using some greedy strategies. In particular, 
with reference to the Ausubel auction, we develop a water­
draining algorithm to assign the traffic of a request among its 
available paths and determine the payment of the transmission in 
approximately constant time. Our simulation results show that 
SAMR can rapidly compute the allocations and payments of 
requests with small sacrifice on the system cost. Moreover, various 
sequencing strategies for sequential auction are also investigated. 
Index Terms-Auction-Based Routing, Multi path Routing, 
Non-Cooperation, Selfish Network, Traffic Assignment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Multipath routing, in which more than one path is used 
to transmit data for the same source-destination (SD) pair, 
has been studied in both wired and wireless networks. In this 
paper, we focus on the approach that traffic is scheduled to be 
transmitted among all its available paths such that the system 
cost is minimized [10], [14]. 
Most of the existing work assumes that all nodes in the 
network are cooperative and comply with the prescribed 
protocols. However, this is not a reasonable assumption in 
networks with selfish nodes, which are only interested in 
maximizing their own "utilities". Selfish nodes may not be 
willing to forward packets for others' flows because of the 
limited resources. They tend to drop data packets of other 
nodes either completely or selectively so as to reduce their 
energy consumptions or save transmission resources. The 
performance of the network as a whole is adversely affected by 
these nodes [12]. Examples of selfish networks include ad hoc 
networks [2] and inter-domain networks [1]. Several routing 
protocols have been proposed aiming at providing incentives 
for selfish nodes to cooperate. These incentives are either 
based on reputation or monetary transfer. 
In a monetary transfer system, payments are used to en­
courage selfish nodes to cooperate [5 ], [21]. The critical 
issue in this system is to determine the proper transmission 
payment. Payment schemes of single path routing with en­
ergy constraints have been excessively studied [2], [7], [19]. 
Some other studies take the selfish behaviours of autonomous 
systems (ASs), operated by different service providers, into 
consideration in inter-domain networks [1], [4], [16]. 
Among the studies on selfish networks, there is little 
work studying multipath routing. The optimal, strategy-proof 
scheme for multipath traffic assignment (OSMA) was pro­
posed in [18] to allocate bandwidth. Since OSMA takes only 
one request at a time, it is not optimal and strategy-proof 
(see the definition in Section II) for multiple requests. Based 
on OSMA, two algorithms for linear and non-linear routing 
prices were derived in [9]. In [17], the general second price 
auction was introduced to alleviate overpayment of multipath 
routing in selfish networks. However, this scheme may result 
in cheating and routing inefficiency. 
In this paper, a general model for multi path routing in selfish 
wired networks is proposed. We adopt the Vickrey-Clarke­
Groves (VCG) auction of the procurement problem to design 
an optimal auction-based multipath routing (OAMR) scheme 
for selfish networks in order to provide incentives for selfish 
nodes to carry flows for other nodes. Moreover, we propose the 
sequential auction-based multi path routing (SAMR) scheme 
with different sequencing strategies as an approximation to 
OAMR to reduce the computational time. Finally, OAMR and 
SAMR are implemented with a batching-based method which 
allocates bandwidth to all routing requests arriving in a certain 
batching period simultaneously. In our evaluation, we find 
OAMR or SAMR can result in lower system cost or lower 
payment-cost ratio, compared to existing schemes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II, technical preliminaries are introduced. In Section III, we 
model the problem of multipath routing in selfish wired 
networks. In Section IV, we present and analyze OAMR. As 
a scalable and approximate solution to OAMR, SAMR is 
proposed in Section V. Section VI exhibits and discusses the 
simulation results. We conclude with suggestions for future 
research in Section VII. 
II. TECHNIC AL PRELIMINARIES 
We first review some concepts from auction theory. Gener­
ally, there are three parties for an auction, namely, auctioneer, 
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bidders, and customers. The auctioneer represents customers 
to conduct the auction. If the customers are procurers, the 
bidders in the auction are suppliers. If the customers are 
sellers, the bidders are consumers. In the following, in the 
first two auctions, the customers are procurers. The customers 
are sellers in the third auction. 
In a general model of procurement auction [6], [8], we 
have an auctioneer, n suppliers as bidders, and m procurers 
participating in an auction to allocate divisible goods to meet 
a set of procurer demands. All bidders attempt to maximize 
their utilities while the auctioneer wants to minimize the total 
cost of satisfying all demands. 
The VCG auction [8] is designed to motivate the bidders to 
truthfully report their private information to the auctioneer. 
The VCG auction is incentive-compatible (IC), i.e. , telling 
the truth is the dominant strategy for any player. Another 
important property of the VCG auction is individual rationality 
(IR), which means that joining the game is always better than 
non-participation. An auction which is both IC and IR is said 
to be strategy-proof. 
Ausubel clinching auction [3] is designed to auction off 9 
divisible goods to n consumers. The price q (t) = t increases 
gradually from q (O) = 0 until the market clears, i.e. , the 
supplies meet the demands. It can be shown [3] that an 
Ausubel clinching auction converges to the VCG outcome. 
III. A MODEL OF MULTIPATH ROUTING IN SELFISH 
NETWORKS 
Assume that there is a directed wired network N = 
(V, E). V = {VI, V2, ... , vn} is the set of n nodes, and 
E = U�=1 Ek is the set of communication links, where 
Ek = {ekl, ek2, ... , ekdk} consists of dk directed links that 
are originated from Node Vk to the nodes in the neighbouring 
node set Vk = {Vkl,Vk2, ... ,Vkdk} E V. Each link ekl E Ek 
from Node Vk E V has a capacity Ckl for transmitting data to 
the neighbouring node Vkl E Vk of Vk. 
A set of R SD pairs is represented as S = {SI, S2, ... , SR}. 
These SD pairs request bandwidth in the form of a request 
vector {ql,q2, ... ,qR}' For each SD pair Si, there exists a 
set of node-disjoint paths [10], [14] Pi = {Fl, ... , Fimi} 
where mi 2: 2. When this condition is not met (i.e. mi = 1), 
unipath routing is applied in selfish networks [2], [7], [19]. 
Each link ekl originated from an intermediate node Vk has 
a marginal cost function ikl (x) and the current available 
bandwidth bkl (where 0 ::; bkl ::; Ckl), which are both 
private information and only known to Node Vk. fkl(X) is 
an increasing function, and represents the cost of forwarding 
one additional unit of traffic when x units of bandwidth has 
been allocated. Indeed, the higher the traffic load on a link, the 
longer the queueing delay or the higher the packet dropping 
probability. The cost for Node Vk to carry a flow requiring 
Ykl units of bandwidth on Link ekl, where Ykl ::; bkl, is 
C ( ) = J,Ckl-bkl +Ykl f (x)dx. kl Ykl Ck!. -bkl kl 
Suppose that Node Vk reports fk = (]kl (X)ll = 1, ... ,dk) 
and bk (bklll = 1, ... , dk) instead of fk 
(jkl (X)ll=l, ... ,dk) and bk (bklll=l, ... ,dk), 
respectively. Here, Node Vk cheats when fk i=- fk or bk i=- bk. 
The source node of an SD pair must pay for the intermediate 
nodes to carry its flows, and this payment must at least cover 
the forwarding costs of the intermediate nodes. Let Pk be 
the total revenue received by Node Vk in forwarding traffic 
from other nodes with the bandwidth allocation on Ek as 
Yk = (Yklll = 1, ... ,dk). Let Ck(Yk) = Lf�1 Ckl (Ykl) be the 
forwarding cost of Node Vk. We assume that all nodes in the 
network are selfish. A selfish node Vk aims to maximize its 
utility, Uk, where 
(1) 
IV. OPTIM AL AUCTION-BASED MULTIPATH ROUTING 
(OAMR) 
In this section, we propose a routing algorithm OAMR to 
handle the bandwidth allocation in selfish networks. OAMR 
is implemented in a batching-based manner in which requests 
arriving in a certain batching period are handled at the end of 
the batching period simultaneously. 
A. Analogy 
We attempt to use the procurement auction to solve the 
mUltipath routing problem in selfish networks. In our analogy 
(see Table I), bandwidths from links on the transmission paths 
of the flows are auctioned off to meet the cOlmnunication 
requests of the SD pairs. The source nodes of these SD pairs 
make certain payments to the intermediate nodes with these 
links such that selfish nodes can be cooperative. 
TABLE I 
ANALOGY OF MULTIPATH ROUTING AND PRO CUREMENT AUCTION 
MUltipath Routing 
Control centre 
SD pair 
Intermediate node 
Bandwidth 
Available bandwidths of links 
Bandwidth request of SD pair 
Procurement Auction 
Auctioneer 
Procurer 
Bidder (Supplier) 
Goods 
Supply of goods 
Demand of goods 
B. Traffic Assignment and Payment Scheme 
Assume that there are R incoming requests in a certain 
batching period. Let vector Xi = (Xij Ij = 1, ... , mi) be 
the set of the allocated bandwidths among Pi. The traffic 
assignment problem (TAP ) can be formulated to minImIze 
the total system cost, subject to the capacity and demand 
constraints as follows: 
n dk 
min W = L L Ckl (Ykt) k=II=1 
(2) 
S.t. Ykl ::; bkl (k = 1,2, . . .  , n) (Capacity Constraints) ( 3) 
L Xij = qi (i = 1, 2, ... , R) (Demand Constraints) (4) 
j=1 
1957 
R mi 
Ykl = L L O�Xij 
where 
i=1 j=1 
s:ij _ {I, 
ukl - 0, 
if ekl of Vk is on PI 
otherwise 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
We adopt a VCG auction of procurement to design the 
payment scheme such that truthful reporting is the dominant 
strategy for selfish nodes. The total revenue received for all 
traffic relayed by Node Vh is Ph' given by: 
( 8) 
where Yh is the optimal bandwidth allocation vector for a 
selfish node Vh, W* is the optimal system cost of TAP, and 
W':h is the minimized system cost of TAP without Node 
Vh. The source node of a flow makes payment to Node Vh 
proportional to the portion of traffic load traversing that node. 
The source node of SD Pair Si should pay Ph to Node Vh, 
. 2::mi 2::dh liij x· . 
where P' = p* .i�l /.-1 h/ 'J h h 2::�!:;1 Vh' 
The following theorem shows that, with this payment 
scheme, each selfish node will report its truthful information, 
i.e., Ck = Ck and bk = hb where Ck = (Cklll = 1, . . .  ,dk). 
Theorem 1: If OAMR is used, truthful reporting is the 
dominant strategy for each node, irrespective of the bids of 
other nodes. 
It can be proved that the utility of any node in the network is 
maximized when the selfish node reports truthfully. The proof 
can be found in [22]. 
Since Uk ?: 0 for any selfish node Vb this encourages selfish 
nodes to join the transmission, resulting in a non-negative 
utility. Consequently, OAMR is also IR. Hence, OAMR is a 
strategy-proof mechanism because OAMR is both IC and IR. 
C. Payment-Cost Ratio 
OMAR requires the source nodes of the SD pairs to pay 
more than the actual costs of the selfish nodes forwarding their 
traffic. In this subsection, we derive the ratio of the payment 
to the system cost, which is defined as follows: 
""n * 
n = L..k=IPk 
W* 
( 9) 
Theorem 2: Suppose fmax and fmin are the maximum and 
minimum values of any marginal cost function fkl(X) after 
and before the allocation through OAMR for any link ekl, 
respectively. That is: 
fmax = max{fkl (Ckl - bkl + Y"'-h,kl)lvh, Vk E V, ekl E Ed 
fmin = min{jkl (Ckl - bkl)lvk E V, ekl E Ek} (10) 
where y"'-h k = (Y"'-h kllekl E Ek) is the optimal allocation 
minimizing
' 
the systen� cost among V \ {vd with respect to 
C-h. The payment-cost ratio n is bounded as: 
1 < n < (n - 1) f max - - fmin 
The proof can be found in [22]. 
(11) 
v. SEQUENTI AL AUCTION-BASED MULTIPATH ROUTING 
(SAMR) 
OAMR needs to solve TAP (n + 1) times, including one 
time for TAP with all network nodes and n times for TAP 
with the node set V \ {Vh} to compute W-h for any Vh E 
V, to determine the allocation and payment scheme. Thus, 
the computational time of OAMR is terribly long when the 
network size and the number of requests are large. In this 
section, a sequential auction-based multipath routing scheme 
is proposed as an approximate algorithm to OAMR. 
A. Analogy 
We fist apply the sequential auction [8] to solve the multi­
path routing problem. In this scheme, bandwidth is auctioned 
off sequentially on each node along the transmission path. 
In each sub-auction, a request from an SD pair is satisfied 
subject to the capacity constraints, and a new analogy between 
the procurement auction and multipath routing can be made. 
Compared with the previous analogy in Table I, the procure­
ment auction in the new analogy consists of one auctioneer, 
several bidders, and only one procurer. The auctioneer needs 
to determine an efficient assignment to meet the procurer's de­
mand. Furthermore, all nodes on a transmission path available 
for the SD pair are grouped as a bidder to participate in such 
sub-auction. Therefore, the available bandwidth of the path is 
viewed as the supply offered by the bidder. 
B. Water-Draining Algorithm 
We develop Algorithm 1, which finds a VCG outcome for 
a single request in a sub-auction of SAMR so as to reduce the 
computational time with reference to the Ausubel auction. 
In each sub-auction in SAMR, a single routing request 
requiring q units of bandwidth is allocated. As is mentioned in 
our model, a set of node-disjoint paths, P = {pI) ... ) pm}, is 
available for the SD pair. Each intermediate node Vk on these 
paths reports its marginal cost function vector of the outgoing 
links fb and the corresponding available bandwidth vector bk. 
Algorithm 1 computes the bandwidth allocation problem in 
a water-draining style such that the price is gradually lowered 
from the highest price. In Lines 19 - 24 of Algorithm 1, a 
certain amount of bandwidth from the set of paths in SP is 
clinched at the current price Pb, and then the accumulated 
payments of the clinched bandwidths to paths via the Ausubel 
clinching auction is calculated. In Line 21, the cumulative 
payment to an active path in SP is calculated when the 
price lowers from Pu to Pb. The intuition is to add up all 
payments for additional clinched bandwidths at each price. 
The clinched amount chj ('f/) at price 'f/ E [Pb, Pu] from pj 
is the additional bandwidth required to meet the bandwidth 
requirement without pj so that the payment of the increased 
1958 
clinched bandwidth d( chj ('f/))  from Path pj is maximized. At 
the end of this step, the price is lowered to Pb and the total 
clinched bandwidth from pj is Xj = q - Y-j(Pb) as in Line 
22. Finally, when the algorithm stops, the vector x converges 
to the optimal assignment for q and pi corresponds to the 
payment (See Theorems 3-4). The computational complexity 
of Algorithm 1 is O((M + l)rlog(�)), where M is the 
maximum number of available paths for an SD pair, E is 
the error bound, and r is the computational complexity of 
computing the function values (i.e. Fj-
l(X) at a given price. 
Algorithm 1: Water-Draining (WD) Algorithm 
3 
4 
5 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Input: Available path set P = {pI, p2, ... ,pm}, marginal 
cost functions fb available bandwidth bk, and 
bandwidth requirement q 
Output: Traffic assignment x = (Xl, X2, ... , Xm) among path 
set P, and a set of cumulative payments to the paths 
p' = (p�, ... ,p�) 
begin 
Initialize: SP+- p, WP+- 0, pu +- 00 ; 
x = 0 and p' = 0, where 0 is zero vector; 
vpJ E P, define FJ(x) = � Epj AI(Ckl - bkl + x) as ekl 
the marginal cost of Path pj, and 
Bj = min{bkllekl E P J} as the available bandwidth of 
Path pj; 
while q < �;:o Xj do 
if SP i= ° then 
I z = argmaxpjEsp(Fj(O»; Pb = Fz(O); Move pz from SP to WP; 
else 
I Network cannot support the request; STOP; 
end 
for each path pj do 
if �PjESP Fj-I(Pb) < q then 
end 
Use bisection method to find Pb ::; 'P ::; Pu 
such that � pj ESP Fj-I ('P) = q and 
Xj::; Bj vpj; 
Pb = 'P; 
if pj E SP then 
20 IIAusubel auction within price interval 
TJ E [Pb,Pu] 
21 pj = pj + gbu TJ d(chj(TJ» = 
pj + gbu TJ' chj(TJ)dTJ, where Pb ::; Pu, 
chj(TJ) = min{Y-j(TJ) - q,O}, Y-j(TJ) = �PhEP,Ph#pj Yh(TJ), and 
Yj(TJ) = Fj-I(TJ); 
22 Xj = max{q - Y-j(Pb),O}; 
23 Pu = Pb; 
24 end 
25 end 
26 end 
27 end 
Theorem 3: SAMR achieves the most efficient traffic as­
signment when it needs to handle just one request. 
Theorem 4: The payments of Algorithm 1 converge to the 
payments in VCG auction whose bidders are paths when it 
needs to handle just one request. 
Interested readers can refer to [22] for the proofs. 
With the WD algorithm, the payment made by the source 
node of an SD pair to its available paths, which act as bidders 
in the sub-auction, is calculated. Then, the payment to any 
Vh E pj can be derived from the path payment pj such that: 
Ph = pj - 2:: Ckl(X;) 
aklEpj k#h 
(12) 
where Ckl (x; ) is the reported cost of x; units of bandwidth 
of Link akl on Path pj. If a node is not on any path in P, it 
will not receive any payment from the SD pair. 
Intuitively, the system costs without Node Vh and without 
Path j are equal for any Vh E pj. Theorem 5 can be derived. 
Theorem 5: If there is only one request needed to be 
handled, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. 
The proof can be found in [22]. 
C. Sequencing Strategies 
The WD algorithm can only handle a single request and 
guarantee truthfulness and optimality for this case. When it is 
necessary to handle R requests with bandwidth demand vector 
{qili = 1, . . .  , R}, the requests must be handled sequentially. 
As a result, the ordering of the requests is crucial to the 
performance of SAMR when dealing with multiple requests. 
Here, we consider three basic sequencing strategies: 
1) Large Request First (LRF): With this strategy, the 
request with the largest bandwidth requirement among all 
outstanding requests is handled first by the WD algorithm. 
2) Small Request First (SRF): With this strategy, the re­
quest with the smallest bandwidth requirement among all 
outstanding requests is handled first by the WD algorithm. 
3) Fixed Amount in Turns (FAIT): With this strategy, re­
quests are auctioned off in turns. In each turn, the maximum 
auctioned bandwidth is capped at � units. The auction is 
repeated until all requests are satisfied. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EV ALUATION 
We evaluate the routing schemes using a simulation program 
in C++. We simulate a real backbone network called Abilene 
which has 11 nodes and 28 directed links with capacity 
C = 10 Gbps [20]. Two different link cost functions, namely 
In( c�x ) [18] and c�x [11] are used in the evaluation. 
For a routing request, the source and destination nodes of 
SD pairs are randomly selected from the set of network nodes. 
The duration time follows a lognormal distribution whose 
mean is 54 seconds [15 ]. The bandwidth requirement follows 
a lognormal distribution with mean 187. 5 Mbps [13]. The 
interarrival time between two successive requests follows the 
exponential distribution with arrival rate A which can be 5/s, 
5. 5/s, 6/s, 6. 5/s, and 7/s. 
In the simulation, we evaluate Unipath routing [2], [19], 
OSMA [18], OAMR, SAMR-LRF, SAMR-SRF, SAMR-FAIT-
50, SAMR-FAIT-I00, and SAMR-FAIT- 150 where SAMR­
FAIT-w is the SAMR using the FAIT strategy with � = w. 
1959 
Our batching-based algorithms are implemented in a cen­
tralized fashion in which the control centre in the network 
collects the routing requests so that bandwidths are reserved 
for them with corresponding payments determined by OAMR 
or SAMR. (See the details of the implementation in [22]. ) 
In the evaluation, three batching periods with T = 5, 10, 
and 15 seconds are considered. The algorithms are compared 
in terms of the following metrics: 
1) System cost: The sum of flow-induced costs at the 
participant nodes is called the system cost or forwarding 
cost of the routing request. 
2) Payment-cost ratio: The payment-cost ratio of a routing 
request is defined as the total payment over the system 
cost. Here, the total payment of a routing request is the 
sum of the payments to intermediate nodes. 
3) Setup time: The setup time of a routing request is the 
period from when the request is sent to the control centre 
to when the bandwidth allocation result is received by 
the source node. 
Due to space limitations, we only show the major results 
and conclusions of the simulation in the following. Interested 
readers can refer to [22] for details. 
A. System Cost 
14�--�--�---�--�--� 
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Fig. 1. Comparison of system cost of different algorithms. 
Fig. 1 shows the system costs of different algorithms when 
the batching period is 5 seconds and link cost function is 
C�x' Among all algorithms, multipath algorithms always have 
lower system costs than that of unipath routing. Compared 
with other multipath routing schemes, SAMR-LRF and OSMA 
have relatively high system costs. Since SAMR-SRF handles 
the smaller requests first and the later larger ones are better 
satisfied with lower system cost, the system cost of SAMR­
SRF is smaller than SAMR-LRF. SAMR equipped with FAIT 
can achieve relatively low system cost among all algorithms, 
since in FAIT the maximum satisfied request is restricted at 
6. so that the bandwidth can be allocated more uniformly. 
Therefore, smaller 6. of FAIT will result in smaller system 
cost. As shown in Fig. 1, FAIT- 50 is the closest to OAMR 
which is the optimal scheme requmng long computational 
time. Theoretically, if 6. is small enough, FAIT-6. can in­
finitely approximate the optimal one. 
The results in other cases with different batching periods 
and link cost functions are similar. SAMR-FAIT can always 
achieve the lowest system cost among all practical algorithms. 
B. Payment-Cost Ratio 
It is expected that the intermediate nodes can be cooperative 
with lower payment-cost ratio. Fig. 2 shows that the payment­
cost ratios for the case with a batching period of 5 seconds 
and link cost function of c�x' Among these algorithms, the 
batching-based algorithms can alleviate the overpayment [7], 
while the payment cost ratios of OSMA and Unipath grow 
dramatically with the increase of the arrival rate. When the 
arrival rate is small, the payment-cost ratio of unipath routing 
is the lowest, because the number of participant nodes in 
unipath routing for a routing request is less than that of 
multipath routing and the total payment is smaller. According 
to Theorem 2, when the arrival rate increases, the difference 
between fmax and fmin becomes larger so that the payment­
cost ratio increases. SAMR-based algorithms distribute the 
flows into the network more uniformly. As a result, SAMR­
based algorithms have lower payment cost ratios. SAMR-FAIT 
can achieve the lowest payment-cost ratio. 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of payment-cost ratio of different algorithms 
Smaller 6. in FAIT results in smaller payment-cost ratio, 
since the maximum auctioned bandwidth is limited and the 
payments of this auctioned bandwidth are reduced. The trends 
of other cases are similar. SAMR-FAIT-50 can always achieve 
the lowest payment-cost ratio. 
C. Setup Time 
Different from unipath routing and OSMA in which the 
unmet requests are dropped, our batching-based algorithms 
delayed the unmet requests to the next batching period until the 
requests are satisfied. As a result, the blocking probability is 
zero in our schemes. In Fig. 3, the setup time of SAMR-based 
1960 
5.5 SAMR-LR' 
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'" -; 4.5 
E SAMR-SRF 
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Fig. 3. Comparison of system cost of different algorithms. 
algorithms for the case with a batching period of 5 seconds 
and a link cost function of c�x is illustrated. 
When the arrival rate is low, the setup time is about half 
of the batching period length. The setup time rises with the 
increase of the arrival rate since more requests are delayed 
to the next batching period due to the shortage of available 
bandwidth. Because SAMR-FAIT- 50 can allocate the band­
width more uniformly (so that more requests are met in the 
current batching period), it has the lowest setup time among all 
illustrated algorithms. It can be found that with the decrease 
of � in FAIT, the setup time of SAMR-FAIT can be reduced. 
In our schemes, there is a tradeoff between setup time 
and system cost and payment-cost ratio. A setup time of 
around three seconds is acceptable to certain applications of 
data transmission. Furthermore, compared with zero blocking 
probabilities in our SAMR routing schemes, unipath routing 
and OSMA have blocking probabilities of 9.69% and 6.89%, 
respectively, when the arrival rate is six requests per second. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have constructed an analytical model to analyze OAMR, 
and SAMR with different sequencing strategies. OAMR can 
guarantee truthfulness and efficiency of selfish nodes for 
multiple requests, while SAMR is truth-telling and efficient 
only for the case of a single request. However, SAMR can 
dramatically reduce the computational time with only a small 
sacrifice in the system cost. The distributed version of SAMR 
can be devised so as to further improve the scalability of the 
allocation mechanism. The proposed scheme can be extended 
to work in the wireless environment. 
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